i-Çin’den | CHINA DESK | SAMPLE REPORT

BYD

Preliminary Chinese Company Assessment

Ownership, Control and Connections Profile | Decision relevance for Türkiye

EXECUTIVE JUDGEMENT **BYD is a privately capitalised, publicly listed industrial group whose legal and effective control remains concentrated around founder Wang Chuanfu. Public evidence does not establish direct state ownership or state control through a voting majority. The company is nevertheless deeply embedded in local Party-state structures, industrial policy, public support and negotiations over market access. A 'private company' is not the same thing as a company independent of the state.**

Decision summary for Türkiye

Dimension	Assessment	Confidence
Ownership and effective control	Founder-led private group; Wang’s management and capital influence is decisive.	High
State connections	State control is not established; policy, local-government and Party-organisation interfaces are substantial.	Medium-high
Türkiye legal entity	The investment company is identified; current ownership and ultimate-beneficial-owner chain require official registry confirmation.	Medium
Financial and technological capacity	Scale and technology capacity are strong; Q1 2026 profitability and cash generation were under pressure.	High
Türkiye investment commitment	Access to incentives is suspended; the investment agreement, obligations and guarantees remain in force.	High
Analytical inference - principal decision risk	Execution priority, contractor oversight and regulatory compliance matter more than ability to pay.	High

CONFIDENCE SCALE High: current primary sources directly support the statement. Medium-high: strong evidence exists, but at least one layer is indirect or historical. Medium: material verification is required because the record is secondary or incomplete.

Decision question

When a company or public institution in Türkiye considers an investment, supply, partnership or incentive relationship with BYD, which legal entity is the counterparty, what control and connection structure matters, and which commitments must be verified separately?

Scope: corporate identity; ownership and effective control; Party-state and local-government interfaces; financial-capacity signals; Türkiye entities; current investment status; material public legal and regulatory signals; and a verification checklist.

1. Corporate identity and control architecture

BYD Company Limited is an industrial group headquartered in Shenzhen and listed in Shenzhen and Hong Kong. Its vertical integration combines automotive manufacturing, batteries and energy storage, electronics manufacturing, photovoltaics and rail systems. Reading the group only as a carmaker would therefore understate both its capabilities and its institutional footprint. [1][3]

Chinese parent company - corporate identity

Field	Verified information
Registered Chinese name	比亚迪股份有限公司
English name	BYD COMPANY LIMITED
Unified Social Credit Code	91440300192317458F
Date established	10 February 1995
Registration / licensing authority	Shenzhen Administration for Market Regulation
Registered capital	RMB 9,117,197,565
Legal representative	Wang Chuanfu
Registered address	No. 1 Yan'an Road, Kui Chong Street, Dapeng New District, Shenzhen
Business scope - summary	Batteries and electronics; new-energy vehicles and components; energy storage; rail equipment; import/export; and related technology services.

IDENTITY NOTE **The Unified Social Credit Code and registered address were verified from the business-licence disclosure in the 2025 annual report; registered capital and legal representative were checked against BYD's official investor-relations information. [1][3]**

Türkiye layer - two distinct functions

Legal entity	Publicly visible function and record	Verification status
BYD Turkey Otomotiv Limited Şirketi	Manisa/Yunusemre-based investment and manufacturing company. Secondary registry derivatives show MERSİS 0195092308100001, registry no. 22274, establishment on 25 July 2024 and current capital of approximately TRY 1.681 billion. [13][14]	Entity identified. Current shareholders, managers and ultimate-beneficial-owner chain should be confirmed through official Trade Registry Gazette records.
ALJ Pazarlama ve Satış A.Ş.	Named as data controller and commercial contact on BYD's Türkiye sales and marketing website; MERSİS 0195086407600001. [12]	Sales/distribution function verified. It is not the same legal entity as the investment company.

VERIFICATION RESULT **Registry search date: 28 July 2026. Exact name searched: BYD Turkey Otomotiv Limited Şirketi. The company was found in public secondary registry derivatives, but full official notices covering incorporation, capital increases, share transfers, managers and representation authority were not obtained through the Trade Registry Gazette/MERSİS in this review. Those notices, a current ownership chart and signature circular should be requested before any transaction.**

2. Ownership, effective control and Party-state connections

1995	¥804.0bn	¥883.7bn	16.90%
established	2025 revenue	2025 total assets	Wang: visible stake at 31 Mar 2026

The critical distinction in the shareholder register

At 31 March 2026, HKSCC Nominees Limited appears as the largest registered shareholder at 40.38 per cent. HKSCC, however, is a nominee through which the holdings of many beneficial owners trading in Hong Kong are recorded collectively. It does not mean that one economic owner controls 40.38 per cent. Failure to make this distinction produces a fundamentally incorrect ownership map. [2]

Actor	Capital / relationship	Control relevance
Wang Chuanfu	16.90% directly registered stake, plus H shares and an asset-management-plan interest.	Chairman and president; the only executive director on a six-member board.
Lv Xiangyang	7.87%; Wang's cousin.	Non-executive director.
Rongjie Investment	5.11%; controlled by Lv and his spouse.	Extends the family-connected private-capital circle.
HKSCC Nominees	40.38% of registered H shares.	Not a single beneficial owner; underlying ownership must be resolved separately.

VERIFIED FACT Wang Chuanfu is chairman and president and the only executive director on the six-member board. Lv Xiangyang and Xia Zuoquan are non-executive directors; three directors are independent. [1]

ANALYTICAL INFERENCE Although Wang's shareholding alone is not a majority, the combination of founder ownership, executive authority and board position indicates founder-centred effective control. Kinship and capital ties with the Lv family broaden the circle of influence; company disclosures do not state that these parties formally act in concert.

Party-state and local-government interfaces

Layer	Verified evidence	What it shows - and what it does not
Internal Party organisation	Official Shenzhen records describe activities of BYD's Party committee. [5]	Shows organisational presence; does not by itself prove that the board is controlled by Party instruction.
Local industrial-chain governance	BYD is the "chain-leading" company in the Pingshan NEV industrial-chain Party committee. [4]	Shows institutional weight within local-government, supply-chain and industrial coordination.
Public support	Approximately RMB 184 million in automotive-related government support was reported for Q1 2026. [2]	Confirms a support relationship; does not quantify total public support to the group.
Trade defence	The EU applies a five-year 17% countervailing duty to BYD Group. [6]	Reflects an EU subsidy finding; it is not a finding of state ownership or day-to-day state control.

3. Operating capacity and financial signals

It is not persuasive to explain the pause in BYD’s Türkiye investment as a basic lack of capability. In 2025 the group generated approximately RMB 804 billion in revenue and RMB 32.6 billion in net profit attributable to shareholders. Vertical integration brings batteries, power electronics, vehicle platforms, electronics manufacturing and energy storage within one capital-allocation system. [1][3]

+3.46%	-18.97%	¥59.1bn	¥246.3bn
2025 revenue growth	2025 net-profit change	2025 operating cash flow	2025 equity

Q1 2026 warning indicators

Indicator	Q1 2026	Change	Interpretation
Revenue	¥150.2bn	-11.82%	Demand and pricing pressure reached group scale.
Net profit	¥4.08bn	-55.38%	Margin and earnings pressure was pronounced.
Operating cash flow	¥2.79bn	-67.48%	Internal financing generation weakened.
Short-term borrowing	¥66.3bn	+72.27%*	Financing needs and working capital require monitoring.
Development expenditure	¥8.29bn	+38.75%*	Technology investment continued, while also increasing cash requirements.

** Compared with year-end 2025. Quarterly figures are unaudited. [2]*

> **DECISION INTERPRETATION** **BYD clearly has the technical and balance-sheet scale to build a plant in Türkiye. The stronger explanation for the pause is not “lack of money” but capital allocation, timing and regulatory return. The deterioration in profit and cash flow can nevertheless sharpen prioritisation across global projects.**

What cannot be verified at this stage?

Public consolidated reports do not disclose the capital budget ring-fenced for the Manisa project, the subsidiary through which it would be funded, cash already transferred into Türkiye, or the project’s current status in internal board-level capital allocation.

4. Verified course of the Türkiye investment

Date	Verified development	Decision relevance
8 July 2024	USD 1 billion; 150,000 vehicles; R&D centre; 5,000 direct jobs; end-2026 target. [8]	High political visibility and an ambitious timetable.
25 July 2024	BYD Turkey Otomotiv Limited Şirketi was registered in Manisa, creating a local vehicle for the investment. [13][14]	The announcement was attached to a legal entity; the current ownership chain still requires official confirmation.
8 October 2024	China challenged additional duties, the import-permit regime and the investment-incentive exemption at the WTO. [7]	BYD’s market-access mechanism became part of a state-to-state dispute.
2025	Public messaging continued, while construction of the Manisa plant did not begin.	Public narrative and physical progress diverged.
9 June 2026	Stella Li said the project was on hold, construction had not begun and no timetable existed. [9]	Global execution priority shifted away from Türkiye.
10 June 2026	The Ministry said access to incentives had been suspended since early 2026, while the agreement, obligations and guarantees remained in force. [10]	Incentive access stopped, but the project was not legally terminated.
26 July 2026	No new corporate timetable confirming cancellation or restart had been announced.	Binding milestones, rather than promises, should drive monitoring.

What does “on hold” mean?

Statement	Defensible use in this report
“Cancelled”	Not supported by public company or Ministry statements; should not be used.
“Proceeding”	Too strong without a new timetable or construction; should not be used.
“Access to incentives is suspended”	Verified current status based on the Ministry statement. [10]
“The agreement and obligations remain in force”	Verified legal/administrative status based on the Ministry statement. [10]
“The project may restart”	A possible scenario, not a verified commitment.

CORE LESSON FOR TÜRKIYE A high-profile investment announcement is not the same thing as an executed investment. Decision-makers should monitor the verified legal entity and representation authority, capital transfers, land and permits, equipment orders, binding milestones, guarantees and clawback provisions.

5. Red flags and legal / regulatory signals

This section is not a comprehensive sanctions, litigation, administrative-penalty or forensic-accounting review. It classifies publicly visible signals that appear material to a decision. The absence of a record is not evidence that the underlying risk is absent.

Signal	Verified status	Decision interpretation
Brazil labour and contractor oversight	Workers employed by a contractor at a BYD factory site were reported in 2024 as being in “slavery-like conditions”. BYD said it terminated the contractor and had not known of the violations. The company was placed on an official list in April 2026 and removed two days later under an interim court order; a final decision remains pending. [15][16]	A material reputation and compliance signal for contractor selection, worker accommodation, passport/wage practices and on-site oversight; not a final finding of systematic corporate liability.
Türkiye incentive performance	Access to incentives was suspended from early 2026 because the investment had not progressed; obligations and guarantees remain valid. [10]	Execution and milestone risk; not evidence of inability to pay or formal cancellation.
EU countervailing duty	A five-year 17% duty applies to BYD Group’s China-origin BEVs. [6]	Subsidy and market-access risk; not a finding that BYD is state-owned.
US connected-vehicle rule	Certain China-linked software and manufacturer transactions are restricted from model year 2027 and certain hardware from model year 2030. [11]	Market-access risk for technology architecture, data, software and supply chains; not a BYD-specific penalty.

> SCOPE EXCLUDED **This sample did not conduct a comprehensive OFAC/EU/UN sanctions review, full China and Türkiye court-record review, administrative-penalty inventory, forensic accounting, site visit or confidential-source work. These should be commissioned separately where material.**

> RED-TEAM JUDGEMENT **It would be premature either to say that BYD has no serious compliance issue or to infer from one foreign matter that the group systematically operates unlawfully. The defensible conclusion is narrower: its scale and multi-country project model require transaction-level verification of contractor oversight, labour practices, incentive milestones and technology compliance.**

6. Same company, different market: regulatory divergence

BYD's capacity placement and partnership model cannot be explained solely through bilateral Türkiye-China relations. European trade defence and the US security approach to China-linked vehicle software and hardware affect where the group produces, which entity contracts, and how technology is structured. These comparisons are used to explain the alternative regulatory return on the Türkiye investment, not to expand China Desk's primary geographic scope.

Scenario	Trigger indicators	Implication for Türkiye	Likelihood
A. Controlled restart	New timetable; construction; equipment; recruitment; supplier contracts.	Scale and timetable may be rewritten.	Medium-low
B. Prolonged pause	Priority for Hungary and EU capacity; Türkiye remains a sales network.	The production commitment loses economic value.	Medium-high
C. Rescoping	Battery, assembly, R&D or smaller capacity replaces the original full-vehicle plan.	Employment and localisation differ materially from the 2024 package.	Medium
D. De facto withdrawal	Formal cancellation, guarantee process or extended zero physical progress.	Public and supplier plans must be rebuilt.	Medium-low

Early-warning indicators

Signal	Where to look	Why it matters
Capital and subsidiary	Trade Registry Gazette, MERSİS records, BYD announcements, subsidiary lists	Does capital, ownership or authority change in the local entity?
Physical progress	Land, permits, EIA, procurement, equipment and contractor records	Separates narrative from executed commitment.
Model and capacity	Product plans, supplier RFQs and job advertisements	Shows localisation depth and economic logic.
Policy	Incentive regime, DS629, EU origin and duty rules	Changes the regulatory return on market access.
Group financing	Annual/quarterly reports, borrowing and subsidiary guarantees	Indicates Manisa's position in global capital allocation.
Compliance and contractors	Contract terms, payroll/accommodation audits and third-party audit rights	Helps prevent repetition of contractor-oversight risks seen in Brazil.

RED-TEAM CONCLUSION Both "BYD has abandoned Türkiye" and "the investment is merely delayed" go beyond the evidence. The most defensible position is: access to incentives is suspended; there is no new timetable; the agreement and obligations remain in force; any restart now requires binding evidence.

7. Verification and negotiation checklist

Priority	Document / question to verify	Risk
1	Current shareholders, ultimate beneficial owner, managers and representation authority of BYD Turkey Otomotiv?	High
2	Milestones, guarantees, termination and clawback provisions in the investment agreement?	High
3	Which subsidiary will execute the project, and what are the capital and financing sources?	High
4	Is there a board-approved current capital budget and investment timetable?	High
5	Which land, permits, EIA, infrastructure and equipment-order steps are complete?	High
6	Models, capacity ramp-up, local inputs and export markets?	High
7	Status of Türkiye production under EU origin and countervailing-duty rules?	High
8	Responsibility for vehicle software, data, OTA, cloud and cyber security?	Medium-high
9	Contractor selection, labour, accommodation and third-party audit obligations?	Medium-high
10	Who will perform sanctions, litigation, administrative-penalty and export-control checks, and to what scope?	Medium-high

Method and evidence standard

Label	Meaning in this report
Verified fact	Information directly supported by the cited source.
Analytical inference	Reasoned interpretation drawn from multiple facts, not presented as the source's direct statement.
Unresolved uncertainty	Area where public evidence is insufficient for a firm conclusion.
Further verification step	Document or check required before a decision.

INDEPENDENCE AND SCOPE **This preliminary assessment is based on publicly available sources. It does not replace legal, financial, sanctions, compliance or formal due diligence. Sanctions/export-control screening, full litigation and administrative-penalty checks, forensic accounting, site visits and confidential-source work are conducted only when expressly included in scope. Necessary specialist reviews should be commissioned before any transaction decision.**

Selected sources

[1] BYD 2025 Annual Report - Corporate identity, governance, shareholding, business licence and 2025 financials.

[2] BYD 2026 First Quarter Report - Shareholder table at 31 March 2026, government support and current financial indicators.

[3] BYD - Basic Information - Registered capital, legal representative and official address.

[4] Shenzhen Government - Pingshan industrial-chain Party organisation - BYD’s position in the local industrial-chain Party committee. Accessed 28 July 2026.

[5] Shenzhen Government - Party organisations in private enterprises - Official record of public activities by BYD’s Party committee. Accessed 28 July 2026.

[6] European Commission - countervailing duties on China-origin BEVs - Five-year countervailing duty of 17% for BYD Group.

[7] WTO DS629 - Dispute concerning additional duties, import permits and investment-incentive exemptions.

[8] Investment and Finance Office of the Presidency of Türkiye - BYD investment announcement - USD 1 billion, 150,000 vehicles, 5,000 direct jobs and end-2026 target.

[9] Reuters - BYD suspends Türkiye factory project - Construction not begun, no timetable and Hungary prioritised.

[10] Anadolu Agency - Ministry of Industry and Technology statement on BYD - Access to incentives suspended; agreement, obligations and guarantees remain in force.

[11] US Department of Commerce - Connected Vehicles Final Rule - Model-year 2027/2030 restrictions affecting China-linked vehicle software and hardware.

[12] BYD Türkiye - Personal Data Protection Notice - ALJ Pazarlama ve Satış A.Ş. and MERSİS details as Türkiye sales/marketing data controller.

[13] Find - BYD Turkey Otomotiv Limited Şirketi - Secondary registry derivative for establishment, MERSİS, registry and capital; not an official registry extract.

[14] Otoajanda - BYD Turkey Limited established in Manisa - 2024 reporting on incorporation capital and first manager; secondary source.

[15] Reuters - Brazil adds BYD to labour-violations list - Contractor practices, 2024 site matter and April 2026 administrative-list decision.

[16] Reuters - court temporarily removes BYD from the list - Interim court order pending final adjudication.

[17] Emre Erol - BYD’s Türkiye pause - Author’s own analysis of the Türkiye investment through European capacity, China policy and the WTO dispute; not independent third-party verification.